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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DeBRY AND HILTON TRAVEL
SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 14335

v.
CAPITOL INTERNATIONAL
AIRWAYS, INC.,
Defendant and
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondent's brief does not meet factual or legal
issues raised by Appellant.

Respondent's brief is rather an

artful attempt to disguise and,avoid the true issues.
As an aid and convenience to the trial court, counsel
for Appellant and counsel for Respondent laboriously drafted and
executed a detailed stipulation of fact (R. 806) .

Appellant will

not burden this record with a detailed analysis of the factual
account in Respondent's brief.

Suffice it to say that the true

and binding factual background is set forth for the Court in the
stipulation of the parties.

Respondent's brief is in large measure

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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an attempt to avoid these stipulated facts and to argue issues
not raised by the appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS ANALYSIS OF THE "FALLING OUT"
BETWEEN APPELLANT AND PRESTIGE HAS NOTHING
TO DO WITH THE INSTANT CASE.
This court has noted that"it is not always true that
a broker who is negotiating a transaction must be exclusively
the agent of one (seller) or the other (buyer).
a 'go-between1 acting for both".

He may well be

Foster v. Blake Heights Corp.,

530 P.2d 815, 817 (Utah 1974).
This lav/suit deals with the relationship between a
broker (appellant) and a seller (respondent).

Respondent's brief

seeks to disguise the true issue by focusing on the relationship
between the broker (appellant) and the buyer (Prestige).

For

purposes of this lawsuit, it simply doesn't matter how or why
Prestige and Appellant had a "falling out", although Respondent's
brief weaves a most fanciful tale about how and why it happened.
This case must be decided by examining the duties which the
seller (respondent) owes to its agent or broker (appellant).

-2-
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POINT II
THE FACTS ESTABLISH CONCLUSIVELY THAT APPELLANT
WAS EMPLOYED AS A BROKER BY RESPONDENT.
The threshold issue in this case is to accurately
characterize the relationship between Appellant and Respondent,
The duties and responsibilities of the parties will clearly
follow from an accurate identification of that relationship.
Here Respondent takes the unsupported position that:
"Under the undisputed facts appellant was simply
the agent of Prestige to obtain quotations on
charter flights from respondent."
(Brief of
Respondent, p. 24)
* * * * *

"Here it is clear that Prestige not respondent
hired appellant;" (Brief of Respondent, p. 29)
[Emphasis in original]
* * * * *

"Respondent had not hired and did not "fire"
Appellant". (Brief of Respondent, p. 34)
Appellant does not deny that it was in some respects
the agent for Prestige.

However, the facts clearly show that

Appellant was at the same time the agent for Respondent.

Foster

v. Blake Heights Corp., supra.
This agency relationship is established by extensive
factual development (R. 809, 810), as well as overwhelming case
authority (Brief of Appellant, p. 9 ) . Respondent's Brief undertakes no rebuttal to any of these facts or authorities.

In

addition, this agency relationship is conclusively established
by a specific brokerage agreement which is in evidence by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stipulation of the parties (R. 819, 825).
In light of such agreement, the existence of which was
stipulated between the parties, it is simply incredible for
Respondent to deny the existence of a brokerage or agency relationship between Appellant and Respondent.

The decisive fact is

simply that the Respondent pays a brokerage or sales commission
every time a travel agent completes a sale and did so in the
instant case in connection with the Chain "C" and Chain "Dn
flights.

If the travel agent is not a broker why does the air-

line pay the sales commission.

Appellant requested the trial

court to make and enter a specific finding and conclusion on
the issue of agency between the parties (R. 829)
made none.

The trial court

A finding on this issue is clearly material to the

resolution of this lawsuit.

An examination of the duties and

responsibilities between Appellant and Respondent requires the
Court to first establish the nature of the legal relationship
which creates such duties and responsibilities.

The trial court's

refusal to make such a finding was, Appellant respectfully submits,
error.
POINT III
THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE INSTANT CASE IS THE DUTY OF
GOOD FAITH WHICH A SELLER OWES TO ITS BROKER OR AGENT.
Respondent's only defense in this entire lawsuit is
that Appellant was not entitled to the 5% sales commission on
the Chain

!I

C" and Chain "D" flights unless and until Prestige

had signed the charter agency agreement.
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Appellant concedes that the parties anticipated the
final execution of the formal charter agency agreement.

Appellant

further concedes that Prestige refused to sign the charter agency
agreement for the Chain "C" and Chain "Dn flights.
this case is why Prestige refused to sign.

The issue in

In other words, did

Prestige refuse to sign because Respondent violated its duties
of good faith to Appellant.
In point of fact Respondent violated its duties to
Appellant in several particulars:
First, a specific term of the brokerage agreement, was
a promise by Respondent not to compete with Appellant in connection with the agency (Tr. 42, 43). Notwithstanding this undisputed
promise not to compete, Respondent initiated direct negotiations
with Prestige in direct competition with Appellant.

Respondent's

conduct violated not only a term of the agreement but the well
settled doctrine that a principal has a duty to refrain from
unreasonably interfering with the work and performance of its
2
agent.
Second, Appellant was only authorized to negotiate
with Prestige by demanding large up front deposits for charter
flights.

However, when Respondent negotiated directly with

It has long been well settled that a principal is
under a duty to exercise good faith toward a broker
with whom the principal deals and is liable to the
broker in the event of the principal's failure to
do so. 12 Am. Jur. 2d § 100.
Restatement of Agency (2d), § 434.

- D - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Prestige, Respondent designed a "floating deposit" which in
essence meant that Respondent sold the Chain "C" and Chain "D"
flights with no separate deposit required (Tr. 277, 278).
Third, notwithstanding the terms of the brokerage
agreement, Respondent refused to provide Appellant with price
quotations which Appellant needed to close the deal (R. 826),
Fourth, Respondent entered into an arrangement whereby
the 5% commission went directly to Prestige (R. 828, Tr. 318).
These techniques proved successful and the flights as
negotiated by Appellant were sold and flown by Respondent.
Appellant received no commission for its efforts in connection
with such flights.
In light of the foregoing, it is little wonder that
Prestige failed to sign the charter agency agreement.

Respondent

and Prestige could simply make a better deal by cutting Appellant
out and that is exactly what they did.
Respondent argues that it made no difference to Respondent
whether the 5% commission was paid to Appellant or Prestige (Brief
of Respondent, p. 3). Thus, presumably Respondent had no motive
to circumvent Appellant as a broker.

The facts are otherwise.

It is clear from the record that not only was Respondent bidding
against other airlines for the Prestige business but that Prestige
was prepared to enter into an agreement with a competing carrier
(Tr. 274, 275-277, Ex. D-31).
In other words, Respondent was being underbid by

-6-
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other airlines on the Prestige account.

However, Respondent

could not lower the price to meet the competition because of
3
its own filed tariffs.
To remedy this situation, Respondent
hit upon the idea of giving the 5% sales commission directly
to Prestige instead of paying Appellant thereby effectively
reducing its price by 5%.

The success of the plan is evidenced

by the fact that Respondent has in fact sold several million
dollars of charter flights to Prestige (Tr. 125).
Appellant's brief cites a host of cases which hold
that a principal or seller cannot unfairly avoid paying a sales
commission (Brief of Appellant, p. 18). Respondent's brief
failed to cite one case to meet this central issue of the case.
Respondent has instead artfully tried to disguise and
avoid the issue.

For example, Respondent argues (and without

any supporting authority) that real estate broker cases are not
analogous to this case (Brief of Respondent, p. 28).

Respondent

has cited no cases which hold that different principles of law
apply depending upon the type of merchandise to be sold.

In

point of fact, one of the key cases upon which Appellant relies
has to do with a fish broker, Abels v. Iceland Products, Inc.,
274 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1960).

Another key case upon which

Appellant relies, deals with a financing broker, Weinger v.
Union Center Plaza Associates, 387 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
See, also, Bamford v. Cope, Colo. App., 499 P.2d 639 (1972).

The Federal Aviation Act only permits Respondent to
fly charters at set published prices. 49 U . S . C . A . § 1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The great body of law on this issue cited by Appellant1 s brief sounds exclusively in contract or agency.

Respond-

ent's only rebuttal to these cases is the evasive response that
Appellant should not be able to pursue its remedy in contract
or agency unless it also simultaneously pursues a remedy in tort
for tortious interference.

(Brief of Respondent, pp. 19, 35)

Again Appellant has asserted this major argument without any
citation of legal authority.
POINT IV
CAB REGULATIONS DO NOT PRECLUDE A RECOVERY BY
APPELLANT.
Respondent argues the interesting proposition that
it is required to pay only one commission pursuant to Regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, which payment is made only pursuant to a written charter agency agreement.

Respondent acknow-

ledges that while it is willing to pay one 5% commission, it
obviously wants to protect itself from the possibility of being
compelled to pay two or more 5% commissions.

Certainly, no one

can fault Respondent for desiring to shield itself from the payment of double commissions.
Respondent goes one step farther and indicates that
it must "thus have a means of protecting itself" (Brief of
Respondent, p. 31) , and that ijE a written contract is the sole
criterion of obtaining such commission, the problem of possible
double liability of Respondent is easily eliminated.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent, however, fails to consider the testimonysetting out the established practice of Respondent when such a
claim for "double commissions" is made.

Mr. Mansfield, Regional

Vice President of Sales of Respondent, testified that when a
dispute arises between two parties as to their entitlement to
commissions that Respondent " . . . don't pay anyone until the
dispute is settled among the other people." (Tr. 177)
Respondent, in addition, urges that the regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board protect Respondent in determining
to whom the commissions should be payable.

There is absolutely

no foundation for such an assertion in the regulations of the
Civil Aeronautics Board.

The CAB regulations say that Respondent

can pay only one commission.

The regulation does not say to whom

the commission should be paid in the event of a dispute between
parties.

Here Respondent determined to pay the commission to

the wrong party (Prestige), in violation of Respondent's established practice and notwithstanding the fact that Appellant
introduced the parties, negotiated the sale of the Chain "C" and
Chain "D" flights, negotiated reduction in the deposit requirements for the flights and otherwise performed under the agreement
between the parties the existence of which agreement was admitted
by stipulation.

The CAB regulation is clearly not designed to

protect Respondent from its own conduct in paying commissions
to a party without regard to its legal obligations or to someone
who has not earned them.

-9-
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Respondent likewise disregards that section of the
Federal Aviation Act which clearly delineates that nothing in
that legislation shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies
existing at common law.
- POINT V
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY COMMISSIONS FOR
THE CHAIN "C" AND CHAIN "D" FLIGHTS.
With respect to Respondent's argument that Appellant
has received at least in part commissions on the Chain "C" and
Chain "D" flights as set out in Finding of Fact XV (R. 802),
adopted by the trial court, Appellant respectfully submits that
such a finding and conclusion cannot be justified by the evidence.
The parties in the instant case stipulated as to what
the payment of $7,287.00 from Capitol to Prestige represented,
i.e., commissions on the Chain "A" flights (R. 818).
While there was no evidence at the trial of this case
as to the payment of any other sums, counsel for Respondent
argued that an additional amount had also been received in settlement of the Prestige litigation (Tr. 340-347).

In that regard,

it is noted that the Prestige litigation involved claims and
allegations in addition to the claim for commissions, which
other claims were compromised, settled and released (Ex. D-53).

49 U.S.C.A. § 1506.

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant timely moved to set the Findings and Conclusions, including Finding of Fact XV aside, but the trial
court denied Appellant's motion and adopted such Finding as
submitted by Respondent's counsel, notwithstanding the Court's
own acknowledgement that Finding XV is not one upon which the
Court based its Findings (Tr. 345).
POINT VI
THE SEQUENCE AND TIMING OF EVENTS SHOW CONCLUSIVELY TEAT TEE EXECUTION OF THE CHARTER
AGENCY AGREEMENT WAS ONLY A FORMALITY.
The brokerage agreement between the parties provided
that the airline (respondent), the travel agent (appellant), and
the customer (Prestige), would all sign a document called a
charter agency agreement.

Respondent's defense in this lawsuit

is simply that the document was not signed by Prestige and,
therefore, the airline (respondent) owes no sales commission
to the travel agent (appellant).

Appellant has argued that the

failure of Prestige to execute such an agreement was due to the
unfair conduct of Respondent in dealing directly with Prestige.
The sequence of events shows conclusively that the execution of
that agreement was only a formality.

Again Respondent has failed

to meet that issue head on and has instead tried to artfully dodge
and avoid the issue.

The record clearly shows that Respondent

never circulates that agreement for signature before the charter
contract negotiations.

Rather, Respondent always circulates

-11-
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that document for signatures after all the negotiations for the
sale of the charters are completed (R. 811).
After all the negotiations for chartering the airplane
are finished, and after the charter contract is consummated,
then and only then does Respondent produce the charter agency
agreement and request signatures.

It is simply unfair and uncon-

scionable for a seller to induce a broker to do all the work and
then avoid responsibility for paying a commission because a document was not formalized after all of the substantive work was
finished.

Respondent urges this Court to ignore the time, effort

and performance of the Appellant in connection with the Chain "C"
and Chain MD" flights and by so doing ratify and approve the
payment of the 5% sales commission on said flights to Prestige.
Respondent places great emphasis on the argument that
the parties had previously signed a charter agency agreement
with respect to the Chain "A" flights.

A reading of Respondent's

Brief on this particular argument could easily lead to the conclusion that the charter agency agreement with respect to the
Chain "A" flights was signed by the parties and that Respondent
paid Appellant the 5% commission with respect to said flights
in the normal course of Respondent's business. However, the plain
fact is that notwithstanding the execution of a Charter Agency
Agreement with respect to the Chain "A" flights, the payment of
the commissions was made only after a suit was instituted by
Appellant to recover those commissions (R. 818) . Thus on the

-12-
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one hand Respondent claims that the execution of the charter
agency agreement is conclusive and determinative on the issue
of who gets commissions and on the other hand Respondent refused
payment of such commissions even where the charter agency agreement was signed by all parties.
CONCLUSION
Appellant therefore urges that the judgment of the
trial court be reversed, as heretofore submitted.
Respectfully submitted,
CLARK W. SESSIONS and
GREGORY B. MONSON of
WATKISS & CAMPBELL:

CLARK)W. SESSIONS
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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